Roll-Ups (Part Two)

Someone a lot smarter than me once said that there are only 3 ways to make money in roll-ups – improve your margins, use leverage, and arbitrage the difference between private and public markets. Today, I’m going to delve a bit into the first roll-up value creating strategy: improving margins.

I worked for a pretty conspicuous roll-up of a B2B distribution vertical. We started as a so-called “poof” roll-up, and then grew at one of the fastest rates in US business history, joining the Fortune 500 from nothing just three years from start-up. We achieved this amazing growth by buying literally hundreds of smaller and mom & pop companies. Practically overnight, we gained a dominant market share position and “assembled” a company worth billions out of all those acquisitions. Along the way, we also helped bring roll-ups into vogue as a business strategy, and we revolutionized the way roll-up methodology is now applied to highly fragmented industries. In short, nobody previously had ever bought so many smaller companies so quickly.

The real magic, and the secret to our success (in my opinion), was our message. It was particularly cogent. The communication of our strategy was persuasive to our sellers, compelling them to let us buy them, and it made intuitive sense to our investors, who provided us plenty of capital to execute our roll-up strategy. We did a great job of getting across to the market the benefits of joining together.

This was essentially our message: We will begin to double the profitability of the companies we buy from day one — a pretty bold statement. You might fairly ask, “How were you able to do that?” The answer: via in-the-bag efficiencies and cost savings. You see, the average target company in our niche had about 5% cash flow (that is, the ratio of trailing, adjusted cash flow to revenues was usually about 5% or 500 basis points). Admittedly, not too exciting profitability. But, as buyers, we brought a couple important things to the table:

  • More Buying Power: Purchasing discounts we negotiated from our suppliers due to our sales volume typically would lower the COGS of our acquisitions at least 400 basis points in terms of cash flow. Buying better makes a huge difference for a small company.
  • Lowered Facilities Cost: By using a nationwide hub-and-spoke system, most of our acquisitions were able to give up or share a warehouse or some other facility with a nearby sister company under our umbrella. The savings from facilities were less immediate, but they were very certain. The savings could reasonably be expected to average around 300 basis points in terms of cash flow, ceteris paribus, when all was said and done.
  • Lower Administrative Costs: As a multi-billion dollar public company, we were able to negotiate better rates from providers for everything from long distance to insurance. The collective savings in administrative costs were typically at least 200 basis points in terms of cash flow.
  • More Products/More Customers: Most of our acquired companies experienced an immediate boost in sales as a result of now selling more products, carrying more SKUs, and getting more sales leads and cross-selling opportunities as a result of becoming part of a larger company. The immediate, collective revenue boost from these factors was typically at least 100 basis points in terms of cash flow.

There you have it – a full 1,000 basis points improvement in the cash flow/revenues ratio (and those aren’t even all the savings/improvements we promised). We told our sellers and investors that if we were even half right, we would still double the profitability of the companies we bought…and it was true.

And how much value did we create doing these acquisitions? Well, add up all the newly acquired and newly created cash flow and then multiply it times the private market (target) and public market (acquirer) differential. Answer: a lot. And a pretty nifty arbitrage, to say the least.

Posted by: Mory Watkins

Minority Interests

Over the years, I’ve seen some pretty shrewd minority deals done. A minority interest can be a less risky, more efficient, and cheaper means of making an acquisition than a controlling interest, particularly when they are negotiated in conjunction with an option to purchase a controlling stake later. Corporate investors often acquire minority interests in companies for exactly the same strategic and economic reasons they acquire controlling interests — access to new products, markets, technology, people, etc. Today I’ll touch on some of the valuation theory and accounting I consider during the acquisition of minority interests.

The valuation and related analyses for a minority interest acquisition are virtually the same as for acquiring the whole entity, except calculations are pro rata, of course. The same methodologies also apply when analyzing accretion/dilution (keeping in mind that balance sheet and P&L treatments may differ according to how much of the target is acquired and whether “control” is established).

Don’t forget, however, that when making a minority investment two important valuation discounts apply:

Discount for Lack of Control: Since minority ownership interests at less than 51% often lack sufficient voting power to control operations, minority shares are inherently less valuable than controlling interests. Minority interests will be valued at significantly less than their pro rata proportion of the entire business. A good rule of thumb is that the average discount for lack of control is about 30 percent less than the value of controlling shares.

Discount for Lack of Marketability: If the minority investment is in a private company, an additional issue is raised. An ownership interest in a business is always worth more if it can be easily sold than if it cannot, and lack of marketability must also be factored into determining the value of a minority interest. A good rule of thumb is that the value of private minority shares should be reduced by an additional 30 to 50 percent relative to the value of controlling shares.

In regards to accounting treatment, a corporate acquirer must account for its minority ownership interest via the cost, the equity, or the acquisition method. The choice of method depends upon how much the acquiring company owns and whether it has control:

If the acquirer owns less than 20 percent of another company’s stock, it uses the cost method for the investment. If it owns between 20 percent and 50 percent, it uses the equity method. These two methods, however, do not lead to actually consolidating the financial statements.

When the acquirer owns over 50 percent of another company, it uses the acquisition method and must consolidate the financial statements. When consolidating, the subsidiary’s equity accounts are eliminated, a non-controlling interest account is created (if it is non-control), the subsidiary’s balance sheet accounts are adjusted to FMV, and goodwill is recognized.

So, minority interests have a lot of positives, but you’ve got to be mindful of (and price in) the associated lack of control and the illiquid nature of minority interests. You also must understand that the accounting presentation (and therefore the accretion/dilution properties) of a minority interest investment will vary according to ownership level and influence.

Posted by: Mory Watkins

Accretion Shortcuts

Today, a brief posting about shortcuts and practical rules of thumb for figuring out whether a prospective transaction might be accretive or not.

I’ll go ahead and give my caveat emptor right now — these shortcuts are only useful when there’s one type or source of consideration. Well, they can also be used to run sensitivity analysis to establish the relation between accretion/dilution and different types of consideration — but whenever a deal has a mix of consideration, you must follow the complete  analytical process I’ve already described in previous postings (and again summarized below).

So, recall that there are three major ways to pay for a target, each with its own effect on EPS:

  • Cash: foregone interest
  • Debt: new interest paid
  • Stock: dilution due to new shares issued

An All Cash Deal is likely to be accretive if the foregone interest expense is less than the seller’s pre-tax income.  Foregone interest expense may be calculated by multiplying the cash investment rate times the purchase price.

An All Debt Deal is likely to be accretive if the new debt interest expense is less than the seller’s pre-tax income.  New debt interest expense may be calculated by multiplying the interest rate times the new debt (very much the same concept as the All Cash Deal).

An All Stock Deal is likely to be accretive if the buyer has a higher PE ratio than the seller. Here, the buyer is effectively buying “cheaper” earnings.

These methods use differences in consideration to project whether you’re likely to be getting more than you’re paying, all other things being equal.

Unfortunately, there is no shortcut for analyzing accretion if consideration is a mix. You must go through the whole process as described in previous postings:

  • Calculate the EPS effect of each part of consideration (foregone interest, new interest paid, new shares issued);
  • Combine the P&Ls and estimate revenue and cost synergies;
  • Combine the balance sheets and allocate the purchase premium;
  • Step up PPE and expense the projected new depreciation;
  • Write up Intangibles and expense the projected new amortization;
  • Calculate new DTLs.

Done carefully and correctly, this process provides a reasonable preliminary accretion analysis.

Next time, I’ll discuss some of the theory and accounting behind the acquisition of a minority interest.

Posted by: Mory Watkins

Combining Balance Sheets

Last time I discussed how P&Ls are combined in M&A transactions and the effect of synergies, changes in the mix of consideration, and balance sheet write-ups on accretion (or dilution).

Today, I’m going to turn to the balance sheets. I’ve already mentioned two of the most important balance sheet changes last time – the write-ups for PPE and Intangibles. Here, I’ll tick down the key balance sheet accounts and touch on some of the combining adjustments.

In combining the balance sheets, I must also address purchase price allocation. I’m not going to go into mind-numbing detail; that’s beyond the scope of discussion here (and actual purchase price allocation should be left to CPAs, tax experts, etc.). In broad strokes, the amount of the purchase price paid in excess of the target company’s accounting value must be recorded on the acquirer’s balance sheet. Accounting conventions require that the purchaser first allocate to tangible assets and then to intangible assets. Any amount that cannot be allocated to identifiable assets is recognized as goodwill. Goodwill therefore represents the excess of purchase price over the fair market value (FMV).

Here is my time tested “quick & dirty” method for combining and allocating purchase price to the key balance sheet accounts. Using this process should give you enough rough approximations of opening combined balance sheet figures for preliminary analysis:

Cash: The combined cash balance of buyer and target is reduced by any cash used in the purchase price.

Short Term Assets/Liabilities: No initial adjustments needed; however, future write-off of A/R or changes in accruals may be necessary.

PPE: As previously discussed, the seller’s fixed assets (PPE) are revalued at the time of the deal and are almost always worth more than the carried book value. The incremental value is added to the balance sheet. The resulting incremental depreciation will lower book earnings and may result in the creation of a deferred tax liability (DTL).

Other Intangibles: Like PPE, intangibles are examined and revalued at the time of the transaction. In most cases the intangibles will go up, resulting in incremental amortization that will lower book earnings. This additional amortization is usually not tax-deductible, so a DTL is created. Regarding purchase price allocation, the purchaser must first allocate identifiable intangibles such as trademarks, patents, and other intellectual property. Any amount that cannot be allocated to identifiable assets is recognized as goodwill.

Goodwill: In merger models, the prevailing convention is to zero out existing goodwill on the target’s balance sheet (the new transaction refreshes goodwill and old goodwill is forgotten). New goodwill is calculated by taking the allocable purchase premium less the write-ups for PPE and Intangibles (mentioned above) and also subtracting the net of the write-off of existing DTL and new DTLs created by the PPE and Intangible write-ups.  Goodwill is assumed to last forever on the balance sheet unless there’s an impairment. There is no tax impact for goodwill unless there’s a write-down.

Long Term Debt: Add any new debt issued for the acquisition.

Deferred Tax Liability (DTL): In merger models, the common convention is that existing DTL on the seller’s Balance Sheet is written off at the time of the transaction regardless of the structure of the deal (stock, asset, or 338(h)(10)). Any new DTL will be calculated from the acquirer’s perspective in the future. As discussed above, write-ups for PPE and Intangibles may create new DTLs related to the transaction. The new DTL obligation may be estimated by applying the acquirer’s tax rate to the sum of the PPE and Intangibles write-ups.

Shareholder Equity: In merger models, the common convention is to zero out seller equity and add the APIC of the buyer’s stock. The shareholder’s equity section of the target’s balance sheet is not transferred; instead, goodwill is created on the consolidated balance sheet to represent the difference between the purchase price and book value of net assets acquired.

So that completes the merger of major balance sheet items. Using this method will provide good, quick insight into the combined entity’s opening balance sheet.

Next time, I’ll go over a couple useful shortcuts and rules of thumb for telling right away whether a prospective transaction will be accretive or not.

Posted by: Mory Watkins

Combining P&Ls

Today I’m going to go into more detail about how P&Ls are combined in mergers — and how it’s analyzed in “real world” corporate M&A.  As I’ve already mentioned, how the P&Ls come together, and what the resulting accretion or dilution will be, drives strategic M&A more than any other factor.  It’s appropriate to drill down now and get more specific about what the combined income statement will look like.

Recall from last time that I addressed synergies and their relative importance. Considering synergies between buyer and seller led to the creation of several new line items on the newly combined P&L: Revenue Synergies (for revenues), COGS Synergies (for direct expenses), and OPEX Synergies (for fixed expenses).

But several other new line items are also needed. Changes to the mix of deal consideration must also flow through the combined P&L. Projected P&Ls include interest income and interest expense figures that assume a certain cash balance. When cash is used as part of the transaction consideration, however, interest income will be lower, so foregone interest on cash is a real cash deal expense that must be considered in accretion/dilution analyses. The potential for cash consideration in the deal means a line item called Foregone Interest is required. Also, a line item called New Debt Interest is necessary, of course, to cover situations where the buyer finances some of the purchase price with debt. Lastly, depending upon the P&L presentation, a line item called New Shares may be needed at the bottom of the combined P&L to show the effect of stock consideration in the deal when calculating accretion/dilution.

Balance sheet write-ups related to the transaction will also affect the combined P&L.  In M&A transactions, the seller’s fixed assets (PPE) is revalued and is almost always worth more than the carried book value.  The incremental increase in value means more depreciation will flow through the combined P&L, so a line item called Depreciation from PP&E Write-Up is necessary.

The other important balance sheet write-up of note concerns intangibles. The amount of the purchase price paid in excess of the target company’s book value is allocated and will usually be at least partially recorded as an Intangible Asset on the purchaser’s balance sheet. The purchaser must first allocate identifiable items (including trademarks, patents, and intellectual property), and then any amount that cannot be allocated to identifiable assets will be recognized as Goodwill. Amortization related to the newly created Intangible Assets will flow through the combined P&L, necessitating a line item called Amortization of New Intangibles. [When there is a relatively large amount of intangibles amortization, it is not unusual to show the accretion/dilution calculation two ways – one including the new intangibles amortization and a pro-forma without it. This is due in some part to the relative subjectivity in purchase price allocation when it comes to intangibles…]

That covers combining buyer and seller P&Ls.  The statements can be literally added together once synergies, changes related to mix of consideration, and balance sheet write-ups are accounted for.

Next time I’ll begin to discuss combining buyer and seller balance sheets in M&A transactions.

Posted by: Mory Watkins

Deal Synergies

Today, I’m going to briefly discuss one of the holy grails of corporate M&A, and the one that acquirers point to most often for justification in a strategic acquisition: synergies. Here’s how synergies are often considered and modeled in the real world.

Revenue Synergies: There are many reasons why one might think that 1+1 is going to equal 3 in an acquisition — maybe salesmen are going to cross-sell now, maybe one party has a stronger distribution channel, or maybe there will now simply be more manufacturing capacity – but how do you include this in the merger model and acquisition analysis? Very similar to what I’ve said before regarding projections, you should use a “bottom up” approach to calculate revenue synergies. Choose any of the most important metrics from the seller’s revenue model (such as average selling price, average customer value, or average units sold), goose it by a fixed percentage, and then add it to the buyer’s revenue model. You would include these calculations in a separate line item on the projected combined income statement called Revenue Synergies.

Expense Synergies: The thinking here, of course, is that 1+1 is presumably going to equal 1.5. Assumptions must be made regarding both variable and fixed expenses. The methodology will again be “bottom up”. The preferred technique is to estimate seller synergies as a percentage of seller revenues and then apply these to the combined entity. There are typically three main candidate categories for expense synergies — employees, facilities, and capital expenditures:

  • For employees, a macro assumption (based on a more detailed analysis) may be made as to whether headcount falls or average expense per employee falls.
  • For facilities, input from someone on the operating team should guide and inform assumptions as to when facilities will be combined and how much the resulting reduced overall facilities expense will be.
  • For CAPEX, you will probably assume that the seller’s capital expenditures will fall as a result of the business combination. A percentage reduction in CAPEX should be reflected on the combined cash flow statement. Don’t forget that there will also be a corresponding reduction in related depreciation.

Add a COGS Synergies line to the model for variable expense reductions and an Operating Expense Synergies line to the model for fixed expense reductions.  Note that there may also be a need to model so-called “negative synergies” or scenarios where the combined expenses will actually go up.  Examples of this include existing customer overlap, differences in accounting, employee benefits, and conflicting suppliers.

Next time, I’ll discuss some methodology for combining the buyer and seller income statements.

Posted by: Mory Watkins