Watchdog or Lapdog?

Take a guess how many corporate accounting fraud cases the SEC has prosecuted through the first half of this year.

Give up? The answer is 79. And that’s the lowest level in over a decade, according to the Wall Street Journal.

A couple months ago, Craig M. Lewis, who heads the SEC’s risk division, unveiled the SEC’s “new”, pro-active approach – an accounting quality model that helps “assess the degree to which registrants’ financial statements appear anomalous.” The analysis will also look at the wording in financial reports concerning companies’ results and future prospects, particularly those under “management discussion and analysis.”

Sounds like a good idea, but…this is “new”?  I’m a bit surprised no one has thought of this before, but apparently that is the case. The SEC acknowledges that its previous means of uncovering fraud have been primarily passive and market-based (i.e., trading irregularities). Really? Isn’t that akin to always closing the stable door after the horse has bolted? Even my $30 tax software has an algorithm that alerts me to audit risk, based on the numbers in my return, before I file my taxes.

I don’t mean to cast stones. I appreciate that accounting fraud is actually very difficult to find, prove, and successfully prosecute. Gathering evidence requires detailed, often forensic accounting work to see whether a company has failed to report its results according to the then prevailing “accounting rules” (my emphasis). And proving there actually was a violation – most often relative to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) – includes an additional layer of difficulty because GAAP itself is often vague and malleable.

Case in point…in a recent accounting fraud prosecution in California involving a high-tech company, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the conviction of the company’s chief financial officer because the government could not prove that his aggressive accounting in recognizing revenue violated GAAP. On the contrary, the appeals court actually opined that the government’s evidence showed he was “doing his job diligently” by skating right up to the line.

Mary Jo White, the SEC’s new chairwoman, has said that she wants to turn the agency’s attention back to what was once seen as its core mission: policing corporate disclosure to ensure everyone is protected. I wish her luck. It’s a crazy world out there, and there’s not much active oversight. Caveat emptor, my buyside brethren. Good thing I’ve got my trusty copy of Financial Shenanigans handy

Posted by: Mory Watkins

Middle Market M&A Activity Update

Today, a quick update on Middle Market (Enterprise Value less than $500M) M&A Activity…

First, the Private Equity Headlines:

  • PE is “leaner” these days, and Middle Market deal volume is lower (1,290 deals announced for LTM Q2 2012; low water mark was 798 in 2009 and high water mark was 1,506 in 2007);
  • From PE perspective, the story is lots of dry powder ($423B) + few good deals = high multiples (the average Enterprise Value/EBITDA multiple is now 8.2x compared to 5.4x in 2009);
  • Also contributing to the high multiples, strategics too have lots of dry powder (cash holdings for the non-financial S&P 500 = $1.2T)

Second, the overall Middle Market Headlines:

  • There were 7,150 deals done ($176B in value) in LTM Q2 2012; this is down 8% and 6%, respectively, from the same period in 2011.
  • Lackluster activity is somewhat surprising given amount of dry powder (both financial and strategic) and prospect of ’12 raise in capital gains.

I would only add that the PE figures above are consistent with the story from PE firms I’m in contact with.  Most are trying to maintain their discipline and believe that deal flow will not return and capital will continue to remain on the sidelines until macro economic confidence increases a bit more.

(The source for all of this information is Thomson Financial. You can find the full report here.)

Posted by: Mory Watkins